Essay About Leadership In Islamic Perspective Of Terrorism

Mainstream Islamic law stipulates detailed regulations for the use of violence, including the use of violence within the family or household, the use of corporal and capital punishment, as well as how, when and against whom to wage war.


Main articles: Sharia, Fiqh, Criticism of Islam, Islamic ethics, and Early reforms under Islam

See also: Application of sharia law by country, Human rights in Islamic countries, Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Arab Charter on Human Rights, Islam and secularism, and Islam and modernity

Sharia or sharia law is the basic Islamic religious law derived from the religious precepts of Islam, particularly the Quran and the opinions and life example of Muhammad (Hadith and Sunnah) which are the primary sources of sharia.[1][2] For topics and issues not directly addressed in these primary sources, sharia is derived. The derivation differs between the various sects of Islam (Sunni and Shia are the majority), and various jurisprudence schools such as Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali and Jafari.[3][4] The sharia in these schools is derived hierarchically using one or more of the following guidelines: Ijma (usually the consensus of Muhammad's companions), Qiyas (analogy derived from the primary sources), Istihsan (ruling that serves the interest of Islam in the discretion of Islamic jurists) and Urf (customs).[3] Sharia is a significant source of legislation in various Muslim countries. Some apply all or a majority of the sharia, and these include Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Brunei, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Yemen and Mauritania. In these countries, sharia-prescribed punishments such as beheading, flogging and stoning continue to be practiced judicially or extrajudicially.[5][6] The introduction of sharia is a longstanding goal for Islamist movements globally, but attempts to impose sharia have been accompanied by controversy,[7] violence,[8] and even warfare.[9] The differences between sharia and secular law have led to an ongoing controversy as to whether sharia is compatible with secular forms of government, human rights, freedom of thought, and women's rights.[10][11][12][13]

Islam and war[edit]

Main articles: Islamic military jurisprudence, Islam and war, Criticism of Muhammad § Points of contention, Muslim conquest, List of expeditions of Muhammad, Military career of Muhammad, Muhammad as a diplomat, and Spread of Islam

The first military rulings were formulated during the first hundred years after Muhammad established an Islamic state in Medina. These rulings evolved in accordance with the interpretations of the Quran (the Muslim Holy scriptures) and Hadith (the recorded traditions of Muhammad). The key themes in these rulings were the justness of war (see Justice in the Quran), and the injunction to jihad. The rulings do not cover feuds and armed conflicts in general.[14] The millennium of Muslim conquests could be classified, technically, as a religious war.

Some have pointed out that the current Western view of the need for a clear separation between Church and State was only first legislated into effect after 18 centuries of Christianity in the Western world.[15] While some majority Muslim governments such as Turkey and many of the majority Muslim former Soviet republics have officially attempted to incorporate this principle of such a separation of powers into their governments, the concept within the Muslim world yet remains somewhat in a state of ongoing evolution and flux.

Islam has never had any officially recognized tradition of pacifism, and throughout its history warfare has been an integral part of the Islamic theological system. Since the time of Muhammad, Islam has considered warfare to be a legitimate expression of religious faith, and has accepted its use for the defense of Islam. During approximately the first 1,000 years of its existence, the use of warfare by Muslim majority governments often resulted in the de facto propagation of Islam.

While the early spread of Islam was often borne on the back of military conquest, within Christianity its early spread was often a matter of political expediency.[16] The minority Sufi movement within Islam, which includes certain pacifist elements, has often been officially "tolerated" by many Muslim majority governments. Additionally, some notable Muslim clerics, such as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan have developed alternative non-violent Muslim theologies. Some hold that the formal juristic definition of war in Islam constitutes an irrevokable and permanent link within Islam between the political and religious justifications for war.[17] The Quranic concept of Jihad includes aspects of both a physical and an internal struggle.[18][better source needed]


Main articles: Jihad, Offensive jihad, Defensive jihad, The Jihad verse (Al-Baqara 216), Itmam al-hujjah, Jihadism, Salafi jihadism, Qutbism, and Opinion of Islamic scholars on Jihad

Jihad (جهاد) is an Islamic term referring to the religious duty of Muslims to maintain the religion. In Arabic, the word jihād is a noun meaning "to strive, to apply oneself, to struggle, to persevere".[19] A person engaged in jihad is called a mujahid, the plural of which is mujahideen (مجاهدين). The word jihad appears frequently in the Quran,[20] often in the idiomatic expression "striving in the way of God (al-jihad fi sabil Allah)", to refer to the act of striving to serve the purposes of God on this earth.[18][19][21][22] According to the classical Sharia law manual of Shafi'i, Reliance of the Traveller, Jihad means to war against non-Muslims, and is etymologically derived from the word mujahada signifying warfare to establish the religion.[23][page needed] Jihad is sometimes referred to as the sixth pillar of Islam, though it occupies no such official status.[24] In Twelver Shi'a Islam, however, jihad is one of the ten Practices of the Religion.[25]

Muslims and scholars do not all agree on its definition. Many observers—both Muslim[26] and non-Muslim[27]—as well as the Dictionary of Islam,[18] talk of jihad having two meanings: an inner spiritual struggle (the "greater jihad"), and an outer physical struggle against the enemies of Islam (the "lesser jihad")[18][28] which may take a violent or non-violent form.[19][29] Jihad is often translated as "Holy War",[30][31][32] although this term is controversial.[33][34] According to orientalist Bernard Lewis, "the overwhelming majority of classical theologians, jurists", and specialists in the hadith "understood the obligation of jihad in a military sense."[35]Javed Ahmad Ghamidi states that there is consensus among Islamic scholars that the concept of jihad will always include armed struggle against wrongdoers.[36]

According to Jonathan Berkey, jihad in the Quran was maybe originally intended against Muhammad's local enemies, the pagans of Mecca or the Jews of Medina, but the Quranic statements supporting jihad could be redirected once new enemies appeared.[37] The first documentation of the law of Jihad was written by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani.

The first forms of military Jihad occurred after the migration (hijra) of Muhammad and his small group of followers to Medina from Mecca and the conversion of several inhabitants of the city to Islam. The first revelation concerning the struggle against the Meccans was surah 22, verses 39–40:[38] The main focus of Muhammad's later years was increasing the number of allies as well as the amount of territory under Muslim control.[39]

According to Richard Edwards and Sherifa Zuhur, offensive jihad was the type of jihad practiced by the early Muslim community, because their weakness meant "no defensive action would have sufficed to protect them against the allied tribal forces determined to exterminate them." Jihad as a collective duty (Fard Kifaya) and offensive jihad are synonymous in classical Islamic law and tradition, which also asserted that offensive jihad could only be declared by the caliph, but an "individually incumbent jihad" (Fard Ayn) required only "awareness of an oppression targeting Islam or Islamic peoples."[40]

Tina Magaard, associate professor at the Aarhus University Department of Business Development and Technology, has analyzed the texts of the 10 largest religions in the world. In an interview, she stated that the basic texts of Islam call for violence and aggression against followers of other faiths to a greater extent than texts of other religions. She has also argued that they contain direct incitements to terrorism.[41][42]

According to a number of sources, Shia doctrine taught that jihad (or at least full scale jihad) can only be carried out under the leadership of the Imam[43][44] (who will return from occultation to bring absolute justice to the world).[45] However, "struggles to defend Islam" are permissible before his return.[43]

Caravan raids[edit]

Main articles: Caravan raids and Ghazi (warrior)

Ghazi (غازي) is an Arabic term originally referring to an individual who participates in Ghazw (غزو), meaning military expeditions or raiding; after the emergence of Islam, it took on new connotations of religious warfare. The related word Ghazwa (غزوة) is a singulative form meaning a battle or military expedition, often one led by Muhammad.[46]

The Caravan raids were a series of raids in which Muhammed and his companions participated. The raids were generally offensive and carried out to gather intelligence or seize the trade goods of caravans financed by the Quraysh.[47] The raids were intended to weaken the economy of Mecca by Muhammad. His followers were also impoverished.[48] Muhammad broke an Arab tradition of not attacking one's own kinsmen by raiding caravans.[48]


Main articles: Quran and violence, Criticism of the Quran, Al-Anfal, and At-Tawba 29

Islamic Doctrines teachings on matters of war and peace have become topics of heated discussion in recent years. Charles Matthews writes that there is a "large debate about what the Quran commands as regards the "sword verses" and the "peace verses". According to Matthews, "the question of the proper prioritization of these verses, and how they should be understood in relation to one another, has been a central issue for Islamic thinking about war."[49] According to Dipak Gupta, "much of the religious justification of violence against nonbelievers (Dar ul Kufr) by the promoters of jihad is based on the Quranic “sword verses.”[50] The Quran contains passages that could be used to glorify or endorse violence.[51][52]

On the other hand, other scholars argue that such verses of the Qur'an are interpreted out of context,[53][54] Micheline R. Ishay has argued that "the Quran justifies wars for self-defense to protect Islamic communities against internal or external aggression by non-Islamic populations, and wars waged against those who 'violate their oaths' by breaking a treaty".[55][56][57] and British orientalistGottlieb Wilhelm Leitner stated that jihad, even in self-defence, is "strictly limited".[58]

However, according to Oliver Leaman, a number of Islamic jurists asserted the primacy of the “sword verses” over the conciliatory verses in specific historical circumstances.[59] For example, according to Diane Morgan, Ibn Kathir (1301–1372) asserted that the Sword Verse abrogated all peace treaties that had been promulgated between Muhammad and idolaters.[60]

Islamic modernists reject the abrogating status of the sword verses, which would result in the abrogation (naskh) of numerous Quranic verses that counsel peace and reconciliation.[61][62]

Prior to the Hijra travel Muhammad struggled non-violently against his oppressors in Mecca.[63] It wasn't until after the exile that the Quranic revelations began to adopt a more defensive perspective.[64] From that point onward, those dubious about the need to go to war were typically portrayed as lazy cowards allowing their love of peace to become a fitna to them.[65]


Main article: Jihad in Hadith

See also: Criticism of Hadith

The context of the Quran is elucidated by Hadith (the teachings, deeds and sayings of Muhammad). Of the 199 references to jihad in perhaps the most standard collection of hadith—Bukhari—all refer to warfare.[66]


Main article: Quranism

Quranists reject the hadith and follow the Quran only. The extent to which Quranists reject the authenticity of the Sunnah varies,[67] but the more established groups have thoroughly criticised the authenticity of the hadith and refused it for many reasons, the most prevalent being the Quranist claim that hadith is not mentioned in the Quran as a source of Islamic theology and practice, was not recorded in written form until more than two centuries after the death of Muhammed, and contain perceived internal errors and contradictions.[67][68]


Main articles: Ahmadiyya view on Jihad, Ahmadiyya § Abrogation, and Persecution of Ahmadis

According to Ahmadi Muslim belief, Jihad can be divided into three categories: Jihad al-Akbar (Greater Jihad) is that against the self and refers to striving against one's low desires such as anger, lust and hatred; Jihad al-Kabīr (Great Jihad) refers to the peaceful propagation of Islam, with special emphasis on spreading the true message of Islam by the pen; Jihad al-Asghar (Smaller Jihad) is only for self-defence under situations of extreme religious persecution whilst not being able to follow one's fundamental religious beliefs, and even then only under the direct instruction of the Caliph.[69][70] Ahmadi Muslims point out that as per Islamic prophecy, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad rendered Jihad in its military form as inapplicable in the present age as Islam, as a religion, is not being attacked militarily but through literature and other media, and therefore the response should be likewise.[70] They believe that the answer of hate should be given by love.[70][71][72] Concerning terrorism, the fourth Caliph of the Community writes:[73]

As far as Islam is concerned, it categorically rejects and condemns every form of terrorism. It does not provide any cover or justification for any act of violence, be it committed by an individual, a group or a government.

Various Ahmadis scholars, such as Muhammad Ali, Maulana Sadr-ud-Din and Basharat Ahmad, argue that when the Quran's verses are read in context, it clearly appears that the Quran prohibits initial aggression, and allows fighting only in self-defense.[74][75][76][77]

Ahmadi Muslims believe that no verse of the Quran abrogates or cancels another verse. All Quranic verses have equal validity, in keeping with their emphasis on the "unsurpassable beauty and unquestionable validity of the Qur'ān".[78] The harmonization of apparently incompatible rulings is resolved through their juridical deflation in Ahmadī fiqh, so that a ruling (considered to have applicability only to the specific situation for which it was revealed), is effective not because it was revealed last, but because it is most suited to the situation at hand.[78]

Ahmadis are considered non-Muslims by the mainstream Muslims since they consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, founder of Ahmadiyya, as the promised Mahdi and Messiah.[79][80][81][82] In a number of Islamic countries, especially Sunni-dominated nations, Ahmadis have been considered heretics and non-Muslim, and have been subject to various forms of religious persecution, discrimination and systematic oppression since the movement's inception in 1889.[79][80][82][83]

Islam and crime[edit]

Main articles: Islamic criminal jurisprudence, Hudud, Qisas, and Tazir

The Islamic criminal law is criminal law in accordance with Sharia. Strictly speaking, Islamic law does not have a distinct corpus of "criminal law." It divides crimes into three different categories depending on the offense – Hudud (crimes "against God",[84] whose punishment is fixed in the Quran and the Hadiths); Qisas (crimes against an individual or family whose punishment is equal retaliation in the Quran and the Hadiths); and Tazir (crimes whose punishment is not specified in the Quran and the Hadiths, and is left to the discretion of the ruler or Qadi, i.e. judge).[85][86][87][88] Some add the fourth category of Siyasah (crimes against government),[89] while others consider it as part of either Hadd or Tazir crimes.[90][91]

  • Hudud is an Islamic concept: punishments which under Islamic law (Shariah) are mandated and fixed by God. The Shariah divided offenses into those against God and those against man. Crimes against God violated His Hudud, or 'boundaries'. These punishments were specified by the Quran, and in some instances by the Sunnah.[92][93][94] They are namely for adultery, fornication, homosexuality, illegal sex by a slave girl, accusing someone of illicit sex but failing to present four male Muslim eyewitnesses,[95][96][97]apostasy, consuming intoxicants, outrage (e.g. rebellion against the lawful Caliph, other forms of mischief against the Muslim state, or highway robbery), robbery and theft.[92][98][99] The crimes against hudud cannot be pardoned by the victim or by the state, and the punishments must be carried out in public.[100]

These punishments range from public lashing to publicly stoning to death, amputation of hands and crucifixion.[101] However, in most Muslim nations in modern times public stoning and execution are relatively uncommon, although they are found in Muslim nations that follow a strict interpretation of sharia, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.[94][102]

  • Qisas is an Islamic term meaning "retaliation in kind" or revenge,[103][104] "eye for an eye", "nemesis" or retributive justice. It is a category of crimes in Islamic jurisprudence, where Sharia allows equal retaliation as the punishment. Qisas principle is available against the accused, to the victim or victim's heirs, when a Muslim is murdered, suffers bodily injury or suffers property damage.[105] In the case of murder, Qisas means the right of a murder victim's nearest relative or Wali (legal guardian) to, if the court approves, take the life of the killer.[106] The Quran mentions the "eye for an eye" concept as being ordained for the Children of Israel[107] in Qur'an, 2:178 : "O you who have believed, prescribed for you is legal retribution (Qasas) for those murdered – the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female. But whoever overlooks from his brother anything, then there should be a suitable follow-up and payment to him with good conduct. This is an alleviation from your Lord and a mercy. But whoever transgresses after that will have a painful punishment." Shi'ite countries that use Islamic Sharia law, such as Iran, apply the "eye for an eye" rule literally.[108][109]

In the Torah We prescribed for them a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, an equal wound for a wound: if anyone forgoes this out of charity, it will serve as atonement for his bad deeds. Those who do not judge according to what God has revealed are doing grave wrong. (Qurʾān, 5:45 )

Capital punishment[edit]

Main article: Capital punishment in Islam


Main article: Beheading in Islam

Beheading was the normal method of executing the death penalty under classical Islamic law.[111] It was also, together with hanging, one of the ordinary methods of execution in the Ottoman Empire.[112]

Currently, Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world which uses decapitation within its Islamic legal system.[113] The majority of executions carried out by the Wahhabi government of Saudi Arabia are public beheadings,[114][115] which usually cause mass gatherings but are not allowed to be photographed or filmed.[116]

Beheading is reported to have been carried out by state authorities in Iran as recently as 2001,[113][117][118] but as of 2014 is no longer in use.[117] It is also a legal form of execution in Qatar and Yemen, but the punishment has been suspended in those countries.[113][113][119]

In recent times, non-state Jihadist organization such as ISIS and Tawhid and Jihad use or have used beheadings. Since 2002, they have circulated beheading videos as a form of terror and propaganda.[120][121] Their actions have been condemned by other militant and terrorist groups, and well as by mainstream Islamic scholars and organizations.[122][123][124][125]


Main article: Rajm

Rajm (رجم) is an Arabic word that means "stoning".[126][127] It is commonly used to refer to the Hudud punishment wherein an organized group throws stones at a convicted individual until that person dies. Under Islamic law, it is the prescribed punishment in cases of adultery committed by a married man or married woman. The conviction requires a confession from either the adulterer/adulteress, or the testimony of four witnesses (as prescribed by the Quran in Surah an-Nur verse 4), or pregnancy outside of marriage.[128][129][129][130]

See below Sexual crimes


Main articles: Islam and blasphemy and Censorship in Islamic societies

Blasphemy in Islam is impious utterance or action concerning God, Muhammad or anything considered sacred in Islam.[131][132] The Quran admonishes blasphemy, but does not specify any worldly punishment for it.[133] The hadiths, which are another source of Sharia, suggest various punishments for blasphemy, which may include death.[134][135] There are a number of surah in Qur'an relating to blasphemy, from which Quranic verses 5:33 and 33:57-61 have been most commonly used in Islamic history to justify and punish blasphemers.[135][136]

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Terrorism and the Muslim "Veil"1

Sahar Aziz
Texas A&M University School of Law

Prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks, Americans' limited exposure to Islam was shaped by Orientalist depictions of Arabs as oil rich Gulf Sheikhs, exotic belly dancers, and brutal dictators along the lines of Saddam Hussein and Muʿammar Qadhdhāfī.2 While international terrorism pre-dated 9/11, its association with Islam was often narrowly limited to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.3 On the domestic front, homegrown terrorism evoked images of white males such as Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber.4 Thus, Americans paid little attention to Muslims in the United States, so much so that Arab American Muslims often complained of being an invisible minority.5

The September 11th attacks, however, marked a sea change in the level of scrutiny placed upon Muslims in America.6 The association of Arabs and Muslims with terrorism became the quintessential stereotype evoked in national security debates.7Media images of dark-skinned, bearded Middle Eastern men permeated the mainstream media, allowing for misinformation about Islam as a violent ideology proliferated among Americans otherwise lacking any exposure to Islam, the Middle East, or Muslims.8 Indeed, the word terrorism axiomatically referred to Muslims, notwithstanding the marked growth of militant nativist groups considered to be right wing extremists by the government and anti-hate watch groups.9

While such scapegoating and stereotyping of American minority groups during times of conflict is a staple of American race politics,10 the post-9/11 era was different in that ethnicity, race, andreligion were at play. Not only were Muslims, whether of South Asian, Arab, or other descent, stereotyped as the "Terrorist Other," but the religion of Islam itself was recast as a political ideology as opposed to a religion.11 No longer was Islam viewed as a religion whose adherents deserved legal protection pursuant to freedom of religion principles, but rather Muslims were viewed as political actors whose faith had been constructively evicted from the protected category of religion.12 Once this shift in the public's perception occurred, criticism and adverse treatment of Muslims went from being considered bigotry or unlawful religious discrimination to being patriotic and "smart" national security policy. In the end, it was as if the burden of protecting the nation fell squarely on the few million Muslims in the United States, who were to pay for this security with their civil rights and liberties.

This paradigm shift had far reaching effects on Muslim communities throughout the United States, ranging from heightened government scrutiny in the form of selective criminal and immigration enforcement to private acts of discrimination in the workplace, schools, and public places.13 An oft-overlooked adverse effect of 9/11 is the notable shift in attitudes toward Muslim women from one of pity and patronization to suspicion and resentment.

The Headscarf as a Symbol of Terrorism

One component of the West's Orientalist approach to the Middle East has been its condemnation of the Muslim woman's "veil" as a tool of subjugation within a larger patriarchal structure.14 While patriarchy is certainly a reality within many Middle Eastern societies, for both Christian and Muslim citizens, the Muslim headscarf has been coopted by many women as part of a larger women's rights movement wherein they seek equal educational opportunities, employment, and status as professionals whose contributions to the welfare of the state extend beyond their homes.15 As such, headscarved Muslim women have touted their freedom to move about easily in their societies without the harrowing eye of men seeking to sexualize their bodies.16 They have also boasted feeling self-respect and dignity when wearing the headscarf in accordance with their personal moral beliefs.17 Indeed, the proliferation of the headscarf in countries like Egypt have transformed it into a fashion item whose color and texture matched young women's trendy clothing and glamorous makeup.18 These women incorporated the headscarf into their daily lives as university students, doctors, engineers, and professors, making a symbol of liberation rather than control. Notwithstanding such sociological shifts taking place in some parts of the Middle East, American feminists for the most part continued to deride the "veil" as a tool of oppression.19 That simplistic, dichotomous monologue was the extent to which the Muslim headscarf was discussed within American society.

But the September 11th attacks changed everything. Feminists' anti-subjugation rhetoric became moot and eclipsed by more existential debates about protecting ourselves from the enemies within our borders. An anxious and angry public called for systematic profiling and heightened scrutiny of Muslims.20 The most visible target was the "marked" Muslim woman wearing a headscarf. Suddenly, her headscarf no longer evoked feelings of pity or confusion, but hatred and suspicion. She found herself a target of racial violence in public places and workplace discrimination.21 She feared for the safety of her school-aged children whose teachers and fellow students harbored anti-Muslim sentiment arising from stereotyping in the media.22 And she questioned whether she should give up her religious right to wear the headscarf to preserve her and her families' safety as well as retain employment needed to financially support her household.23 And yet she had few organizations she could turn to in defense of her rights at the intersection of four identities: a Muslim, a woman, a racial or ethnic minority, and usually an immigrant.

Intersectionality Discrimination

Muslim women of color experiences what is known as "intersectional discrimination" in critical race legal theory.24 Intersectionality discrimination goes beyond an aggregation of factors such as race, gender, or religion by acknowledging the discrimination that arises from an interaction of these characteristics.25 Hence, it aims to provide an account of a whole person whose subjectivity is shaped by different discourses in a particular social historical context. As such, the headscarved Muslim woman does not merely face one-dimensional discrimination as a woman, a practicing Muslim, an immigrant, or a person of color. Rather, she faces intersectional discrimination experienced only by "headscarved Muslim women of color."

Muslim headscarved women face multiple stereotypes that portray them as oppressed, subjugated, and coercively domesticated. Since 9/11, she has faced the additional stereotypes of being a disloyal and anti-American terrorist or terrorist-sympathizer.26 Meanwhile, she is subject to the broader societal biases against women that penalizes them for exhibiting behavior associated with men. For instance, women who are assertive and openly ambitious are stereotyped as "bitches," not being a team player, or feeling undeservingly self-entitled. Also, women who do not wear makeup or dress feminine are criticized as unprofessional, masculine, and unappealing. As a result, women in America continue to face challenges in the workplace particularly in terms of equal pay and equal opportunity to high level leadership positions notwithstanding advances in women's rights.27

Intersectional discrimination against Muslim women is manifested in various forms. The most glaring is in public spaces where many headscarved women have found themselves victims of attacks while driving their cars or walking in public.28 The image of the headscarf triggers a violent reaction from strangers who scream out racial and religious epithets such as terrorist, a "f*ing Muslim," along with demands that they "go home" and get out of America. Many Muslim women have their headscarves ripped off by their assailants.29 By late 2010, the frequency of violence committed against Muslim women based on racial and religious animus rose at a troubling rate. In a span of two months, at least six reported cases of hate crimes across the country were committed against Muslim women wearing a headscarf.30

Discrimination against Muslims in employment also rose dramatically after 9/11.31 Many employers have either refused to hire Muslim women applicants who donned the headscarf or changed their policies to coerce their Muslim women employees to remove their headscarves.31 Some used pretextual no-hat policies, while others claimed that the scarf frightened customers and reminded them of 9/11.32 Ironically, the right to work and be economically independent had long been a priority of Western feminists' in their attempts to "save" Muslim women from patriarchy. And yet, Muslim women faced obstacles to employment in the United States while American women's organizations remained deafeningly silent.

Intra-Community Hierarchies

But Muslim women's experiences with intersectional discrimination are not limited to mainstream America. They often face obstacles to attaining equality within intra-community hierarchies that limit their influence to subjects affecting the home or children.33 Muslim communities are led predominantly by men who were born and raised abroad in Muslim-majority countries.34 Thus, they incorporate their cultural norms, which range from patriarchal to patronizing, in their dealings with Muslim women. Predominantly male perspectives cause resources to be directed toward forms of discrimination common to Muslim men, thereby obscuring the discrimination experienced by Muslim women. Muslim leaders and spokespersons claim to speak for Muslims, but often fail to incorporate women's perspectives beyond a superficial defense of their right to wear a headscarf. Resources are used to protect the right to build mosques and religious accommodation in the workplace, as well as to counter the media's negative stereotyping of Muslim men.35 In contrast, the focus on discrimination unique to women is often limited to a case-by-case basis rather than a more effective systemic approach with women integrated into the anti-discrimination campaign.

While well-intentioned and pious, many Muslim leaders do not prioritize Muslim women's grievances in their institutional agendas. Whether the issue is equality of facilities in mosques, equal access to mosque boards of directors, or intersectional discrimination by mainstream society, women's priorities rarely make it into Muslim institutions' top initiatives.36

Further complicating the predicament is the onslaught of anti-Muslim prejudice directed at Muslim men and Muslim communities writ large. As communities across the country experience mosque vandalism, hate crimes, forced exile on no-fly lists, profiling in airports, and aggressive law enforcement tactics that border on entrapment,37 intra-community gender rights are quickly marginalized. Therefore, the allegations that internal power struggles are rooted in male dominance, even if true, only reinforce negative stereotypes of (male) Muslims as oppressive, pathologically authoritarian, and deserving of suspicion.

Challenging male patriarchy within the Muslim communities also subjects a woman to allegations of harming the collective interests of Muslims in America—additional harms they cannot afford in light of political and physical attacks by the public and the government. These practical concerns deny Muslim women the ability to contest gender-biased interpretations of religious doctrine and cultural practices thereby stifling a healthy evolution of Islam in America. In the end, the new generation of Muslim women leaders may have little choice but to support defensive strategies that collectively marginalize Muslim women within American Muslim communities.

Rethinking Post-9/11 Leadership Strategies

As the post-9/11 era enters its thirteenth year, the persistent discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians can no longer be characterized as mere backlash. Public bias is on the rise, and the government continues to ratchet up its aggressive preventative counterterrorism campaign against Muslims.38 The stereotype of the "Terrorist other" is now deeply entrenched in American race politics. Because women bear a significant brunt of the adverse consequences, a rethinking of post-9/11 civil rights strategies is long overdue.

Four specific strategies would go a long way toward empowering, de-essentializing, and granting agency to Muslim women. First and foremost, the unique forms of discrimination and subordination experienced by Muslim women, particularly those easily identifiable as Muslim, must be acknowledged and incorporated into anti-discrimination campaigns. Toward that end, there needs to be more media coverage about how Muslim women experience post-9/11 discrimination and are uniquely impacted by anti-Muslim bias in ways that their male counterparts are not. Second, more Muslim women must be included in leadership positions in Muslim advocacy groups, American women's rights groups, and national security advocacy groups. Hate crimes and discrimination against them should be viewed as a woman's rights as well as a national security issue, not just a religious bias issue. Third, Muslim women in advocacy leadership positions should be diverse in order to ensure the various political viewpoints, religious practices, and ethnic backgrounds are represented in all decision-making processes. Fourth, government efforts to prevent post-9/11 backlash through community outreach efforts or civil rights litigation must purposely include a diversity of Muslim women in the relevant meetings and dialogues with the Muslim communities. If Western feminists want to be taken seriously in their call for universal women's rights abroad, they must face the skeletons in their own countries' closets. Their organizations must confront the double standards whereby they adamantly defend the rights of women in the "Muslim East" yet neglect their own society's discrimination against Muslim women. Such subordination is not limited to garden variety discrimination but also occurs in the national security context, which can make it prohibitively hazardous to wear the headscarf.

Despite having more than ten years to arrive at this realization, many American women's rights groups have yet to include post-9/11 discrimination in their scholarly and activist agendas because they shortsightedly view it as a national security issue.39 Although some feminists may feel no loss at the end of the Islamic practice of veiling, which they believe contradicts the values of liberalism, they cannot escape their own culpability in stripping Muslim women of agency and individuality—two fundamental principles undergirding American feminism. Muslim women in the United States, just like their non-Muslim counterparts, deserve the social and political space to make their own decisions on how to live. But, as this paper argues, the status quo has made it difficult to do so without paying a high personal price in the form of unemployment, physical assault, and social and political marginalization. Western feminists should be looking to Muslim women to take the lead in developing strategies and projects tailored to experiences that only they can articulate. By inviting more Muslim women into women's rights organizations and campaigns, the inclusion of diverse voices will occur organically. Likewise, non-American Muslim feminists can support existing efforts by Muslim women rather than attempting to lead or speak on their behalf.

Although there is no singular, unitary "Muslim woman" that can represent the diversity of women who identify as Muslim, many Muslim women experience similar adverse consequences because they are collectively stereotyped as meek, powerless, oppressed, or in the post-9/11 era sympathetic to terrorism. Overt acts of violence and insidious forms of economic discrimination against some headscarved women restrict a woman's freedom of choice in practicing her religion. The threat this poses to a woman's life and livelihood should not be taken lightly. The right to work directly impacts a woman's self-esteem, individual autonomy, and placement in the power hierarchy of her family and community. Similarly, her inability to feel safe because of the headscarf strips her of a fundamental right to safety and religious expression.

The challenge now rests with Muslim civil rights, American women's rights, and civil liberties advocacy groups to uphold the rights of all women and all Muslims, rather than subordinate these women's interests to the dominant group's agenda. The urgency of this project does not stem from merely abstract notions of justice, but from real civil rights violations—headscarved women have increasingly become targets of entrenched anti-Muslim attitudes, and consequently suffer palpable harm. Addressing this challenge is essential not only to restoring their dignity, but also to strengthening American values of religious freedom and gender equality.


Sahar Aziz is an associate professor at Texas A&M University School of Law where she teaches national security, civil rights, and Middle East law. Her work has been published in the Harvard National Security Journal, the Gonzaga Law Review, the Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal, and the Middle East Institute. She is a fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and a member of the Egyptian American Rule of Law Association (


1This essay is based on a longer article entitled "From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality," 9 Hastings Race & Pov.y L. J. 1 (2012), available at

2See Nadine Strossen, "Freedom and Fear Post-9/11: Are We Again Fearing Witches and Burning Women," 31 Nova L. Rev. 279, 306 (2007).

3See Richard T. Micco, "Putting the Terrorist-sponsoring state in the Dock: Recent Changes in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Individual's Resource Against Foreign Powers," 14 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 109, 109 (2000); Roberta Smith, "America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The United States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law and International Response," 5 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 249, 257 (1997).

4See generally Michael J. Whidden, "Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism Legislation," 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2825, 2849 (2001); Ari D. McKinnon, "Counterterrorism and Check and Balances: The Spanish and American Examples," 82 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 602, 608 (2007).

5Rachel Saloom, "I Know You Are, But What am I? Arab-American Experiences Through the Critical Race Theory Lens," 27 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 55, 76 (2005).

6"About Islam and American Muslims," CAIR, (last visited May 4, 2012).

7See Editorial, "Terrorists Hiding in Hijabs: Muslims Seek Special Treatment to Elude TSA Groping," Wash. Times, Nov. 17, 2010, (arguing that by granting religious accommodation to Muslim women who wear the headscarf, terrorists will use it to elude security measures).

8See Robert A. Kahn, "The Headscarf As Threat: A Comparison of German and U.S. Legal Discourse," 40 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 417, 419 (2007) (finding that Judge Thorpe repeatedly identified the headscarf as the means for accomplishing terrorist acts in her ruling and discussed the idea that an "insincere" terrorist could threaten national security by falsely posing as a religious Muslim at the department of motor vehicles stating that "wearers of full face cloaks would 'pretend to ascribe to religious beliefs in order to carry out activities that would threaten lives.'"); see also Kathleen M. Moore, "Visible through the Veil: The Regulation of Islam in American Law," 68 Soc. Of Religion, 269 (2007) (While most Muslim women in the United States choose not to wear the hijab, the visibility of it as a focal point for controversy influences American perceptions about what constitutes Islam. Such cases as the Florida driver's license case of Sultaana Freeman putatively pit a benighted image of Islam against the necessities of national security, and only serve to entrench already polarized opinions about the nature of Islam. Worse, such a binarism posits gender relations as an essential point of divergence between the Islamic world and secular democracies, and promotes the simplistic view that cultures are set on an unavoidable collision course, a clash of civilizations. Not only is the hijab a volatile emblem that can be viewed as a symbol of male oppression or of modesty and religious or cultural identity, it is also intertwined with discussions about the assimilability of Muslims in western societies.).

9See Widden, supra note 3, at 2829.

10Alexander Zaitchik, "Glenn Bleck rises again," Salon (Sep. 23, 2009, 06:22 ET),; see Sheryll Cashin, "To Be Muslim or 'Muslim-Looking' In America: A Comparative Exploration of Racial and Religious Prejudice in the 21st Century," 2 Duke F. for L. & Soc. Change 125, 126-130 (2010) (citing evidence that bias against Muslims is more likely to be expressed explicitly and accepted without public outrage in contrast to bias expressed against other minority groups).

11See Greg Bates, "Back with a Vengeance: The Return of Racial Profiling," Counterpunch (Aug. 20, 2010), (summarizing a statement by Rudy Maxa, the travel expert in residence on the public radio program Marketplace from Aug. 11, 2004, that, "No subject is more controversial right now than racial or ethnic profiling. Paying special attention to passengers of Middle East descent can get an airline in trouble. Pull more than two such passengers aside per flight for special scrutiny, and an airline risks a lawsuit. But captured al Qaeda documents show that Arab men are probing for weaknesses in U.S. security. So, is secondary profiling at airports a civil rights violation? I say no. Not if done efficiently and with respect and courtesy. Political correctness mustn't get in the way of security"); see The Boks Man, Dan Fanelli Ad, YouTube (May 6, 2010), (documenting an ad campaign by Dan Fanelli, a Republican nomination to challenge Rep. Alan Grayson in Florida, speaking against "political correctness" and explicitly supporting racial profiling).

12See Mark H. Hunter, "SLU Professor Talks About Significance of Hijab," The Advocate, Dec. 5, 2010, (discussing the hijab's role internationally and in the Muslim experience).

13See Am. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., The 2010 ADC Legal Report: Legal Advocacy & Policy Review 2 (2011), available at; see Questions and Answers About the Workplace Rights of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Laws, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).

14Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, "Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban," 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 743, 750 (2006) (discussing the origin and significance of the headscarf in Islamic history and in the French headscarf debate); see also Alia Al-Saji, "The Racialization of Muslim Veils: A Philosophical Analysis," Phil. & Soc. Criticism 875, 888-893 (2010) (discussing the significance of the headscarf in the American context).

15See infra note 15.

16See Pamela K. Taylor, "France, Spain and Syria: To ban or not to ban the burqa?," Wash. Post (Jul. 23, 2010), (seeing the hijab (the headscarf and long, loose clothes) as the "ultimate 'up yours' to the cult of causal sexuality that seemed to have overtaken American youth, the abusiveness of the beauty industry, and the objectification of women by Hollywood and advertisers that had spawned an epidemic of anorexia and bulimia among young women and its flip side, an epidemic of obesity, which left practically no woman happy with her body" and felt the "hijab was delightfully freeing, a way of stepping outside that game and rejecting it utterly."); see also Cecile Laborde, "Female Autonomy, Education and the Hijab," 9 Critical Rev. of Int'l Soc. & Pol. Phil. 351, 365, available at (discussing that the hijab liberates them from the perceived dictates of Western fashion and from the pervasive sexualization of women's bodies).

17See supra note 15.

18Asra Q. Nomani, "Hijab Chic," Slate, Oct. 27, 2005, http:// (describing a Nordstrom fashion show in Virginia that was directed to conservative Muslim women); Shaimaa Khalil, "Muslim Designers Mix the Hijab with Latest Fashions," BBC, May 14, 2010, http://; Theresa Perkins, Unveiling Muslim Women: The Constitutionality of Hijab Restrictions in Turkey, Tunisia and Kosovo, 30 B.U. Int'l L.J. 529, 534 (2012).

19See Code Pink in Iraq, CODE Pink, (last visited Dec. 24, 2011); Discrimination in Law, EQUALITY NOW, (last visited Dec. 24, 2011) (listing nations in which EQUALITY NOW is working; the United States is not on the list).

20See H.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010).

21See, e.g., Tarice Gray, "Muslim American Girls Taunted, Assaulted at School for Wearing Hijab", (Dec. 21, 2010), (reporting that "The Greater Los Angeles office of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-LA) says it's hearing from students and their parents saying that children are being verbally harassed and tagged with labels like 'terrorist' or 'jihadi,' just for being Muslim and that girls have reported being physically assaulted for wearing hijab, the traditional headscarf worn by Muslim women."); see also Engy Abdelkader, "In Post-9/11 World, Anti-Bullying Bill Carries Special Significance", N.J. L.J., Dec. 20, 2010 (reporting that post-9/11 harassment of American-Muslim and South- Asian youths has dramatically worsened including derogatory name-calling and physical threats and violence); see also Felicia Sonmez & Michelle Boorstein, "Few fireworks at hearing examining civil rights of American Muslims", Wash. Post (Mar. 29, 2011), few-fireworks-at-hearing-examining-civil-rights-of-americanmuslims/2011/03/29/AFykZtvB_story.html (testifying that evidence indicates that religiously-inspired bullying of youth also is increasing.); see also John Doyle, "New 'Bias' Attack on SI Muslim," N.Y. Post (Oct. 14, 2010), (reporting that a man was arrested for punching a headscarf-wearing woman and her four-year-old son from Staten Island); see also Tracy Clark Flory, "Abercrombie Hates Your Hijab," Salon (Feb. 25, 2010), feature/2010/02/25/hijab_abercrombie_hollister_discrimination (discussing a Muslim employee of Abercrombie & Fitch Co.'s allegation that she was fired for not removing her headscarf when she was initially told she could wear one. She was later told by a visiting district manager that scarves were not allowed during work hours. She said that she was fired when she refused to take it off.); see also Amy Joyce, "External Symbols of Faith Can Unfairly Add to Interview Stress," Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 2005, at F6 (telling the challenges in obtaining employment faced by a Muslim woman who wears the headscarf due to employers discomfort with her headscarf).

22But see All-American Muslim (TLC television broadcast series, premiered Nov. 13, 2011), the first reality show depicting Muslims as ordinary people with diverse beliefs and lifestyles. Unfortunately, TLC has received threats demanding that it stop airing the show because it misinforms viewers about the serious threat regarding the terrorist inclinations of all Muslims. Sheila Musaji, "American Companies Accused of Joining the All-American Anti-Muslim Bandwagon," Am. Muslim (Dec. 20, 2011),

23See supra note 20.

24See Strossen, supra note 1, at 306 ("Before Sept. 11, Muslim women who wore head scarves in the United States were often viewed as vaguely exotic. The terrorist attacks abruptly changed that, transforming the head scarf, for many people, into a symbol of something dangerous, and marking the women who wear them as among the most obvious targets."); John Blake, "Muslim Women Uncover Myths About Hijab," CNN (Aug. 19, 2009), (reporting that "some hijab-wearers say that strangers treat them as if they're terrorists"); see also Nadine Naber, "'Look, Mohammed the Terrorist Is Coming!' Cultural Racism, Nation-Based Racism, and the Intersectionality of Oppressions after 9/11," Scholar & Feminist Online (Summer 2008), (identifying cultural racism as a "process of Othering that constructs perceived cultural (e.g., Arab), religious (e.g., Muslim), or civilizational (e.g., Arab and/or Muslim) differences as natural and insurmountable" and nation-based racism as a construct that treats certain immigrants as potentially criminal or immoral).

25See Iyiola Solanke, "Putting Race and Gender Together: A New Approach to Intersectionality," 72(5) Mod. L. Rev. 723 (2009) (highlighting that additive discrimination claims fail "to acknowledge the black woman as 'an integrated, undifferentiated, complete whole' with a 'consciousness and politics' of her own." Quoting Regina Austin, "Sapphire Bound!," 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 539, 540 (1989)).

26See Gowri Ramachandran, "Intersectionality as 'Catch 22': Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable," 69 Alb. L. Rev. 299, 302 (2006) (noting that intersectionals "experience a qualitatively different kind of subordination").

27See Sheryl Sandberg, Lean In 162 (2013).

28See infra note 29.

29See Mackenzie Carpenter, "Muslim Women Say Veil is More About Expression than Oppression," Pittsburgh Post- Gazette (Oct. 28, 2001),; see also Franchesca Benzant, "Donning the Hijab: My Day As an Undercover Muslim Woman," Clutch (Dec. 9, 2011), (detailing the author's experience as part of an outreach effort by the Muslim Women of Maryland challenging women to wear a hijab for a day. The author also recounted another participant's post-9/11 experience, stating, "One girl who was Muslim admitted that this was her first time wearing the hijab since 9/11. She used to be teased to the point students would yank her hijab off of her head and once it was even thrown in the toilet."); see also Nadine Naber, "'Look, Mohammed the Terrorist Is Coming!' Cultural Racism, Nation-Based Racism, and the Intersectionality of Oppressions after 9/11," Scholar & Feminist Online (Summer 2008), (citing incidents of school children having their headscarf pulled off while commuting to school).

30See John Doyle, "New 'bias' attack on SI Muslim," N.Y. Post (Oct. 14, 2010 1:14 am),; see Janet I. Tu, "Woman charged with hate crime against two Muslim women," The Seattle Times (Oct. 22, 2010), http://; Gina Potthoff, "FBI Investigates Reported Assault on Local Muslim," The Columbus Dispatch (Dec. 20, 2010),; Harassment Allegedly Began After Victim Began Wearing Islamic Scarf, Novanews (Dec. 22, 2010), scarf/; see "CAIR: FBI Asked to Probe Bias Motive for Harassment of Ore. Muslim," PR Newswire (Dec. 21, 2010), 112274619.html.; see Ben Botkins, "Twin Falls man arrested for allegedly harassing Muslim," Magic Valley News (Dec. 24, 2010),; see Levi Pulkkinen, "Hate Crime Charge Filed in Seattle Grocery Store Attack," Seattlepi (Jan. 4, 2011), available at http:// (reporting the man was charged with a hate crime of malicious harassment); "CAIR: Seattle Muslim Targeted in Bias Attack," (Jan. 5, 2011), php?id=xprnw.20110105.DC25496&show_article=1.; Jamie Schram and Maura O'Connor, "Muslim Gal assaulted in Harlem," N.Y. Post (July 8, 2011),; Editorial, "Tennessee Knife-Wielding Driver Shouts "I'll Kill You," Spews Religious Slurs at Muslim Mother and Son," Al-Jazeerah (July 28, 2011), Wielding%20Driver%20Shouts%20I'll%20Kill%20You,%20Spews%20Religious%20Slurs%20at%20Muslim%20Mother%20and%20Son.htm.; "CAIR-MI Asks FBI to Probe Threat Against Muslim Driver," PR Newswire (August 7, 2011), driver-127096513.html.

31See "Religious Freedom Has a Place in the Workplace," FindLaw (Nov. 9, 2010),; see also Marisol Bello, "Controversy Shrouds Muslim Women's Head Coverings," USA Today, (Apr. 15, 2010),; "Discrimination Against Muslim Women-Fact Sheet," ACLU (May 29, 2008), (article with statistically backed numbers as to discrimination or harassment complaints that stemmed from head covering); Elizabeth K. Dorminey, "Veiled Meaning: Tolerance and Prohibition of the Hijab in the U.S. and France," The Federalist Society For Law And Public Policy Studies (May 29, 2012), http://www.fed-soc. org/publications/detail/veiled-meaning-tolerance-and-prohibition-of-the-hijab-in-the-us-and-france (addresses the EEOC statistics for 2010: "In FY 2010 the EEOC reported receiving 3790 charges from individuals alleging religious discrimination or harassment. Of these, the EEOC reported that 3782 were resolved. Following an investigation, the EEOC issued 'no cause' determinations—a finding by the agency that there was no evidence from which they could conclude that discrimination or harassment had occurred—in 2309 cases. Seventy-three cases were successfully resolved through conciliation; there were 847 'merit resolutions,' which means that the case was probably resolved through litigation, and more than $10 million in monetary benefits were paid to employees by employers. An unscientific review of reported cases in which plaintiffs has completed the EEOC process and filed lawsuits suggest that the vast majority of religious discrimination or harassment cases in recent years have been brought by, or on behalf of, Muslims." Further, also addresses the EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc. case and brings up another case, EEOC v. Kelly Services).

32Campbell v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., No. Civ.A. 303 CV737H, 2006 WL 2865169 at 2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 2006); EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch, Co., No. CV10-3911-HRL (N.D. Cal. 2010).

33See Kimberlé Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139 (examining the failure of anti-discrimination law to account for the multiple influences of racism and sexism on the lives of black women); see also M. Imran Hayee, "For Muslim Women, Wearing a Veil Isn't Oppression," Star Tribune (Aug. 17, 2011), otherviews/127972598.html (The author, a male Muslim, justifies use of the headscarf as a religious marker, notably omitting his wife's narrative and thereby exemplifying her denial of agency within the community).

34See Ahmed Eid, "UnMosqued: Why Are Young Muslims Leaving American Mosques?," Huffington Post (17 Oct. 2013),

35In nearly every joint national press conference called by Muslim organizations, the individuals speaking in a representational role are consistently males despite their 50 percent female constituency. One of many examples includes the joint press conference responding to President Obama's speech on May 18, 2011, about democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. The Council on American Islamic Relations issued a joint statement citing the following Muslim leaders of the largest American Muslim organizations, all of whom are males: "Those who watched or spoke following the president's speech included CAIR National Executive Director Nihad Awad, Naeem Baig of the Islamic Circle of North America, Mahdi Bray of the Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation, Dr. Mohammed Elsanousi of the Islamic Society of North America, Mouaz Moustafa of the Libyan Council of North America, and Dr. Louay Safi of the Syrian American Council." Press Release, "CAIR: Obama's 'Arab Spring' Address Sets the Right Tone," CAIR (May 19, 2011, 4:15 pm), Article Details.aspx?mid1=777&&ArticleID=26779&&name=n&&currPage=2; Press Release, "CAIR: CAIR Calls for Reform of FBI's Training on Islam, Muslims," CAIR (Sept. 21, 2011, 6:15 pm),

36Jen'nan Ghazal Read and John P. Bartkowski, "To Veil or Not to Veil?: A Case Study of Identity Negotiation among Muslim Women in Austin, Texas," 14 Gender & Society 395, 406-07 (2000), (shows a struggle between what society deems good or appropriate and what the individual who wishes to be veiled views as good); Jehanzeb Dar, "Part 1: Time to End Gender Segregation in Mosques," (Nov. 30, 2011), (discussing the various ways in which Muslim men are privileged within the American Muslim community).

37See, e.g., "Hamden Mosque Vandalized," EyewitnessNEWS3 (Feb. 25, 2011) (reporting that a mosque in Hamden, Connecticut, was marred with spray-painted profanity and graffiti, having experienced such vandalism four times in the past two years.); see also, John Doyle, Frank Rosario & Jessica Simeone, "'Drunk' desecration at mosque," N.Y. Post (Aug. 26, 2010), (reporting on a man who barged in began cursing at the mosque attendees and ultimately urinated on the prayer rugs before he was able to be escorted out); see also "CAIR: Southern California Mosque Vandalized," CAIR-CA (Dec. 13, 2009), (accounting the vandalism of a mosque in Los Angeles where vandals shattered windows and glass doors of the mosque and broke into the donation boxes, further commenting that an Oregon mosque was previously targeted with hate graffiti reading, "Allah is a pig"); See Robert Koenig, "Discrimination, hate crimes against Muslim Americans rising, officials say," St. Louis Beacon (Mar. 29, 2010, (documenting that "while Muslims represent less than 1 percent of the U.S. population, officials said about a quarter of religion-related workplace discrimination cases involve Muslims, as well as more than 14 percent of the overall number of federal religious discrimination cases" with the Anti-Defamation League reporting "an intensified level of anti-Muslim bigotry'"); see Press Release, "ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Unconstitutional 'No Fly List'," ACLU (Jun. 30, 2010), security/aclu-files-lawsuit-challenging-unconstitutional-no-fly-list; "Wrong Then, Wrong Now: Racial Profiling Before & After September 11, 2001," Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education Fund, Feb 21, 2003, at 27 (documenting and critiquing "terrorism Profiling" specifically the profiling of Arabs, South-Asians and Muslims at airports).

38See David Cole & Jules Lobel, Less Safe, Less Free, 26–33 (2007) (explaining the government's "preventative" approach of detaining people based on "group identity or political affiliations"); President George W. Bush, Address Before the United States Military Academy Graduating Class (June 1, 2002) ("If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long…The war on terror will not be won on the defensive.") (transcript, video recording, and audio recording available at The White House, (last visited Jan. 5, 2012)). Attorney General John Ashcroft prepared the following statement: In order to fight and to defeat terrorism, the Department of Justice has added a new paradigm to that of prosecution - a paradigm of prevention…Our new, international goal of terrorism prevention…involves anticipation and imagination about emerging scenarios, the puzzle pieces of which have yet to come into alignment. John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks Before the Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 10, 2003) (prepared remarks available at U.S. Dep't of Justice, (last visited Jan. 5, 2012)).

39Similar to domestic violence programs that do not gain White support until it is viewed as affecting the white community, the collective punishment of Muslim women arising out of terrorist acts by Muslim (men or women) that undermine gender rights is ignored unless white women experience an analogous context. See Crenshaw, supra note 32 at 1258–59 (discussing the prerequisite for domestic violence to affect White communities before domestic violence programs that affect minority communities are supported by mainstream White communities).

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